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Response to Matthew W. Finkin
and Catherine Barnard
LYNN DUGGAN"
Professor Matthew Finkin provides an inventory of options in international
employment regulation, follows this with an examination of international cross-
fertilization of domestic social policy before and after the New Deal, and concludes
with a comparison of employment law in Minnesota and Indiana to illustrate policy
variation among midwestern U.S. states.' He asserts that it is unlikely that
international regulatory efforts will consist of any more than international lending
criteria that encourage "'upward sedimentation' of better, if not best, practices in
developing economies,"2 basing his opinion on the global hegemony of corporations
and the post-World War II trend toward insularity.
Finkinnotes two approaches to the analysis of corporate power in the era of rapidly
globalizing capital: The first claims that regnant capitalism stands astride states and
"hollows out" their regulatory capacities, and the second, that there is no inherent
- necessity that globalization will result in this tendency.3 The truth, of course, is
somewhere in the middle. In the absence of international regulation, corporations are
free to search out the lowest-cost labor and resources in the least-regulated economies
of the world, subject to the constraints of transportation costs and availability of other
infrastructure. Indeed, if individual firms do not take advantage of low-cost
production options, economic models predict that other firms will do so and will drive
them out of the market. International capital thus requires a legal framework-some
"rules of the game"--to free firms from the "race to the bottom,"4 in the process
reducing costs (including wages) below what is environmentally and politically
sustainable in the long run. In the past, welfare states' provision of labor standards,
education, environmental regulations, health care, and business and human-level
insurance in recessions solved this type of market failure at the national level, and in
so doing had fostered income and productivity growth.5
The same logic applies to the international economy, but most economists do not
acknowledge the need for similar institutions and policy to resolve market failures at
an international or global level.6 However, with increasingly global production, trade,
and finance, nation states are constrained by falling tax revenues (as firms relocate to
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countries with lower taxes and cheaper labor) and by falling currencies (when finance
capital relocates to avoid devaluation, bringing about greater devaluation in the process).
As these massive market failures and the mechanisms for theirprevention become clear,
institutions parallel to those of welfare states may be used to bolster and insure the
international macroeconomy.
But welfare states varya great deal and represent varying types of compromise among
Finkin's "regnant capitalists" and the different class, social, and demographic groupings
within nations. This brings me to a related questionregarding the relativelybipolar labor
standards of Indiana versus Minnesota, cited by Finkin as evidence of insularity among
citizens of different states within the United States. At first glance these states may look
similar, aside from differences in educational attainment, but the race/etmnicity data
Finkin provides go no deeper than to note the percentage of these states' populations
that are "white."7 Within this "whiteness," I would venture to suggest that there are large
differences in the cultural background of the populations of these two states and that the
Scandinavian heritage of Minnesotans has been a significant factor in the development
of higher labor standards in that state's laws.
Indiana, by contrast, not only does not have the decidedly Scandinavian heritage, but
was settled to a large extent by migrants from Southern states, such as the Carolinas,
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, some of which were slave states prior to the Civil
War.8 It is likely that Indiana's and Minnesota's populations did not value the notion of
their own "whiteness" (in stark contrast to slaves'/former slaves' "blackness") in the
same ways, and that the types of ethnic and racial tensions generated in each state were
therefore quite different.' Hence, when it comes to intracountry comparisons, it may
prove fruitful to compare solutions to public-goods problems and other market failures,
with an eye to the relationships among racial and ethnic groups, and to compare
national-level solutions while keeping in mind the disenfranchisement of demographic
groups within the nation. Perhaps U.S. policymakers' insularity has something to do
with the fact that U.S. industries historically negotiated with a labor force unique in the
degree to which it was riven by racial strains and the histoiy of exclusion and
nonenforcement of citizens' rights, with acute implications for labor solidarity..
Proceeding to Professor Catherine Barnard's paper, a richly-textured history of the
social charter of the European Union, I would like to focus on the preliminary question
framing her analysis, that of whether there is or will be "social dumping' within the
European Monetary Union ("EMU") if regulations are not undertaken to prevent it.'"
Barnard mentions the "constraints imposed by the convergence criteria and EMU" and
the argument that "Member States have lost their ability independently to regulate
interest rates and exchange rates."" But she does not return to the question whether this
will severely constrain nations' ability to pursue social policy, focusing instead on
7. See Finkin, supra note 1, at 158, 159 tbl. 1.
8. See ELEANOR MYERS, A MIGRATION STUDY OF THE THIRTY-TWO STATES AND FOUR
ORGANIZED TERRITORIES COMPRISING THE UNITED STATES IN 1850, at 20, 22 (1977); EMMA
LOu THORNBROUGH, INDIANA IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA: 1850-1880, at 540 (1965).
9. See DAvID R. ROEDIGER, Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of 'White Ethnics' in
the United States, in TOWARDTHEABOLITIONOF WITENESS: ESSAYSONRACE, POLITICS, AND
WORKING CLASS HISTORY 181 (1994).
10. Id. at 36-37.
11. Id. at40.
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evidence for and against firms' migration to areas with cheaper labor, ultimately
dismissing this debate as unresolved. 2 In failing to deal with the implications of
currency union on states' social policy, Barnard weakens the argument for a social
charter and focuses on the issue of citizen rights only insofar as they legitimize the
EMU. 3 When barriers interfering with the free flow of money, goods, and services are
dismantled, states lose a degree of autonomy and, with it, their capacity to incur debt to
pursue social goals, a phenomenon that warrants much more attention than it has
received up to now. 4 Increased currency flows and speculation have produced this
effect in various countries around the world-witness the severe constricting effects on
national budgets of currency devaluations in Mexico, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia."
As an economist, my main criticism of this paper is that it overly emphasizes
economic factors. Barnard's discussion ofthe efficiencies of federalism-decentralization
or centralism suggests that the equilibrium solution to this problem will be determined
by efficiencies of decisionmaking and economies of scale, but much more is at stake
here than efficiency.
The proposed fusion ofmarket-making and market-correcting that Barnard describes
is compatible with this economistic lens. The trend Barnard notes of the resolution of
the public-good/externality problem of employee training to increase firms'
"competitiveness," while improving efficiency within an industry or occupation, falls
in the category of corporate cost cutting, with governments or the European Union
providing the training previously supplied by firms, as in the model of internal labor
markets described by Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt. 6
This type of analysis ignores a large part of the question whether trausnational
regulation is necessary and justifiable, which has to do with workers' rights to act as
citizens-rather than as factors of production-in the face of supemational forces of
supply and demand; for example, with the extent to which anintemationalpolitico-legal
system can buffer workers from global economic forces, allowing people the option to
remain in a place and a community, and to resist economic pressure to follow roving
capital. People are not as capable or willing to vote with their feet as is necessary for
federalism to operate most efficiently, and Barnard briefly notes that there are "major
costs (including linguistic and cultural costs) to the mobility of citizens between
Member States."' 7 But the tools offeredbymainstream economics will notprove helpful
in upholding citizens' rights. Mainstream economics frames citizens, who needtime and
continuity in one place to participate in politics and community, only as workers and
consumers.
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